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THE PROBLEM WITH ECONOMICS IN FOREST
PLANNING ... AN OVERVIEW AT THREE LEVELS
Alan G. McQuillan'
I. INTRODUCTION
At a meeting of forest economists in 1981, Richard Behan, University
of Montana Forestry School Dean, presented a paper entitled "RPA/
NFMA: Time to Punt."2 In the evening fireside discussion that followed, a
senior forest economist from the Washington office of the Forest Service
said, "Maybe we [forest economists] promised more than we could
deliver." This was a dramatic admission.
The statement is correct, and with the analysis that follows, it is clear
that the problems associated with economics in the forest planning system
are not the prime causes of the current impasse in implementing the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA). 3 Instead, fundamental
problems frustrating the implementation of NFMA arise within the
language of the regulations designed to implement the Act, and, beyond
this, in the failure of the Forest Service to correctly interpret the true intent
of Congress in formulating NFMA, the restoration of the public trust in
Forest Service land management.
II. FORPLAN-DID THE AGENCY PROMISE MORE THAN IT
COULD DELIVER?
The National Forest Management Act was the first legislation to
enforce substantive statutory restrictions on the Forest Service.' It made
specific stipulations as to where timber could be harvested on national
forest lands, restricted the rate of timber harvesting on those lands and
made other stipulations regarding the management of non-timber re-
sources including water, diversity of plant species, and so on.' First and
foremost, the Act required the agency to produce comprehensive forest
plans for each and every national forest in the nation by the end of 1986 and
1. Associate Professor of Forest Management, University of Montana School of Forestry. In
1979, Dr. McQuillan received his Masters degree in Forest Management, and in 1982, he completed
his Ph.D. in Forest Management, both degrees from the University of Montana. The author presented
a version of this paper at the Eleventh Annual Public Land Law Conference at the University of
Montana, April 29, 1989.
2. Address by Richard Behan, Annual Meeting of Western Forest Economists (May 5, 1981).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1982).
4. Wilkinson and Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L.
REv. I (1985).
5. Id. at 371.
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to repeat the planning process every fifteen years or sooner.6 Two of the
most important decisions made in the planning process are the determina-
tion of those lands considered suitable for timber management within the
forthcoming decade (the suitable timber base) and the determination of
the allowable annual sale quantity (ASQ) from such lands for the same ten
year period.
In the early 1970s, when the Forest Service realized that the
traditional approaches toward harvest scheduling would produce a "fall-
down effect" or reduction in the level of sustainable yield, the agency
implemented a policy of nondeclining even-flow (NDEF) with respect to
the timber harvest7 and adopted an ingeniously designed linear program-
ming (LP) model for this purpose.8
It is not surprising that, in designing the forest planning system
following NFMA, LP-literate analysts within the agency realized that
they could enlarge their existing linear programming approach to harvest
scheduling to embrace the broader aspects of benefit-cost analysis. The
result was a sophisticated linear programming model (FORPLAN) 9
designed to implement a maximum net present value (NPV) objective
function in the presence of numerous physical and policy-related con-
straints. The use of NPV as the objective function allowed the adoption of
the dollar as the common unit of measure and supposedly embraced long-
run objectives as superior to immediate returns and cash flow." Maximum
NPV was also the measure of economic efficiency which had received the
blessing of the prominent economist Paul Samuelson. 1 This constrained
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(c) and (f).
7. Parry, Vaux, and Dennis, Changing Conceptions of Sustained- Yield Policy Oil The National
Forests, 81 J. FORESTRY, 150 (Mar. 1983). NDEF first entered the regulations in 1963, but the old
allowable cut formulas did not implement the policy. The adoption of LP-based harvest scheduling in
the early 1970s allowed implementation, and the policy was reiterated in 1973 in Emergency Directive
16. Behan, Political Polarity and Conceptual Nonsense: The Strange Case of Sustained Yield
Forestr', 8(2) ENVTL. L., 309, 339-40, (1978). In 1976, NDEF was incorporated in N FMA, Section
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(m) (1982).
8. D. Navon, Timber RAM. . .a Long-Range Planning Method For Commercial Timberlands
Under Multiple-Use Management (1971) (U.S. Dep't of Agric., U.S. Forest Service, unpublished
research paper PSW-70).
9. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, A USER'S GUIDE To FOREST PLANNING
MODEL (FORPLAN) 1-172 (1980).
10. The management of the national forests for the "greatest good of the greatest number in the
long run" was first espoused by Forest Service founder Gifford Pinchot in 1905. The famous "Pinchot
Letter" is reproduced in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICUITURAL HANDBOOK No. 453, Tui PRINCII'LE
LAws RELATING To FOREST SERVICE ACTIVITIES 138-9 (Sept. 1978).
11. Samuelson, Economics Of Forestry In Evolving Society, 14(4) ECONOMIC INQUIRY 466-
492 (1976). This approach necessitates the use of discounting techniques whereby costs and benefits
accruing in distant future time periods have little impact on the solution. It is generally agreed that
future generations have a large stake in the management of our nation's forest lands. Some argue that
Adam Smith's guiding hand %korks intertemporally so that landowners maximizing current land values
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maximization approach to planning decisions appeared to offer the best of
two worlds. The primary objective was economic efficiency in a broad
multiple-use sense, and the model also allowed the incorporation of non-
economic considerations through a manipulation of the myriad constraints
entered into each run of the FORPLAN model. 2
With FORPLAN, forest economists hoped to deliver the optimal
solution to the problem of allocating national forest lands to what might be
called their "highest and best use." This allocation was to be considered not
in terms of strict cash flow-based efficiency, but in terms of broad social
welfare as measured by "net public benefits," including the recognition of
externalities and the provision of amenities and public goods which are not
valued on the open market. Theoretically, the agency could use the harvest
scheduling capabilities of FORPLAN to ensure that the land allocations
and scheduled activities within each allocation were consistent with the
long-standing principle of sustained yield.' Thus, FORPLAN's optimal
solution was to be efficient both spatially (in terms of which lands are
allocated to what activities) and temporally (in terms of the scheduling of
activities to comply with sustained yield over the long run).
To produce such a model is a monumental task, a task not dissimilar to
that faced by the rulers of centrally planned economies such as the pre-
glasnost Soviet Union.' 4 All of the usual problems of benefit-cost analysis
arise, but on a larger than usual scale. These will be reviewed briefly.
Since national forests are managed for multiple goals, the agency
must first reduce these goals to a single unifying objective function (such as
maximum NPV) with the attendant problem of measuring as many
outputs as possible using a single measure of system performance (dol-
lars). 5 In FORPLAN, so-called priced outputs can include not only those
commodities where one can, in principle, observe prices in the market
(primarily timber for harvesting and range for grazing of domestic
do indeed take care of future generations. See Stroup, Planning And Freedom Of The Individual, in
PERSPECTIVES IN RESOURCES PLANNING 74 (A. McQuillan ed. 1977). Others argue that discounting,
by its very nature, shortchanges the interests of future generations. Personal correspondence from
Chandler Morse, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY (1976). Some of the
effects of discounting's failure to allow for future costs are seen, for example, in the benefit cost analysis
of a proposed hydroelectric dam. Costs of major repair and maintenance work which do not have to be
borne for five decades do not figure largely in the analysis. Yet the press has lately been rife with stories
of the multi-billion dollar costs that the public faces for repair and maintenance of aging hydroelectric
plants, nuclear facilities and similar technological wonders of past eras.
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 9.
13. For a thorough discussion of the notion of sustained yield, see Parry, Vaux, and Dennis,
supra note 7, at 150-154.
14. R. HEILBRONER, THE MAKING OF AN ECONOMIC SOCIETY 183-191 (1972).
15. See generally C. CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMs APPROACH (1979); J. VON NEUMANN AND 0.
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR II (1947).
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livestock), but also outputs not usually priced on the open market such as
water yield, sediment (a negative output), fish, big-game animals, devel-
oped and undeveloped recreation opportunities, and so on. To the extent
possible, these outputs were priced using "willingness-to-pay" values,' 6
dubbed by some Forest Service analysts as "funny money numbers." And,
although some economists, including John Duffield, 7 have made recent
progress in determining these values, many professionals still regard them
as conceptually suspect. 8
When "willingness-to-pay" values could not adequately price certain
forest outputs, the optimization-modelling approach incorporated them in
the form of constraints on the optimal solution. Thus, for example, the Lolo
National Forest Plan forced FORPLAN to allocate 225,000 acres to big-
game winter range. 9 The nature of such a constraint is to make the acres
allocated infinitely valuable up to the level of the constraint, and of no value
at all beyond that critical level. Besides placing a heavy burden on
personnel to correctly identify the exact level of the constraint, this
represents a very crude approach to delineating diminishing marginal
returns.
The adoption of this deterministic, analysis technique raised another
formidable problem by requiring the agency to identify many important
input-output relationships (coefficients), and particularly the interrela-
tionships between resources. Currently, forest science techniques are
incapable of stating many of these relationships in a reliable quantitative
manner. For example, although much is known about the interaction
between timber harvesting and elk movement, or between road-building
and soil erosion, the agency cannot reliably convert this knowledge into
16. Examples for willingness-to-pay values for recreation are found in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
U.S. FOREST SERVICE, LOLO NATIONAl FOREST PLAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
B-28 (1986) [hereinafter LOLO FEIS]. For a general discussion of the concept, see Krutilla, Bowes and
Wilman, National Forest System Planning and Management: An Analytical Review and Suggested
Approach in GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTIONS, SOCIAl. NEEDS, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF U.S.
FORESTS 223 (R. Sedjo ed. 1983).
17. See generally Duffield, RPA Values For Recreation: Theory atnd Practice, in this volume.
18. Historically, the Forest Service has not been known to take its own assessment of these
"willingness-to-pay" values very seriously. For example, in preparing the 1980 RPA assessment for
this region (Region I ), I found that agency figures indicated that the gross value of water production
exceeded the gross value of all other benefits combined by over 300 percent. And, in the alternative most
favorable to timber production (alternative 2), the net benefits from recreation, wilderness and wildlife
together exceeded the benefits of timber management by over 200 percent. A. McQuillan. Report Of
Economic Analysis Of Forest Service Region 1 - 1980 Draft RPA Data 19 (July 1979) (unpublished
paper available from U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Northern Region, Missoula, MT). These findings were
not used to re-evaluate the relative emphasis that was to be placed on the various agency programs.
traditionally dominated by timber management. For a discussion of timber dominance, see generally
D. CI AR', TImBER AND THE FOREST SERVICE 252 (1986).
19. Loi o FEIS, supra note 16, at Appendix B, 31-32, 72-73.
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simple coefficients in terms of elk per acre-logged, or tons of sediment per
mile of road construction for input to FORPLAN. Yet, consideration of
factors such as these is crucial in the task of forest planning.
Besides the problems associated with measurement, certain logical
problems also arise. For example, when an NPV-maximizing objective
function is coupled with constraints designed to ensure nondeclining even-
flow (NDEF), violations of NFMA inevitably result under certain com-
mon conditions. Unless forest planners restrain FORPLAN from consid-
ering prescriptions with negative objective-function coefficients (which
they do not), the periodic planning process20 can actually produce
declining levels of harvest overtime, violating section 11 of NFMA, despite
(and in fact because of) the inclusion of NDEF constraints in FOR-
PLAN.21 This logical non-sequitur occurs because not all of the implica-
tions of this constrained-maximization approach were thought through
prior to its adoption.
Distinct from the problem of finding the maximum NPV under
certain constraints, the adoption of a linear programming model (FOR-
PLAN) raised other serious deficiencies in the planning methodology. LP
requires the adoption of certain restrictive assumptions including propor-
tionality, additivity, divisibility, and certainty. These assumptions raise
certain well-documented problems such as the inability to model diminish-
ing marginal returns, returns to scale, fixed costs and other economic
realities. 2 In addition, LP is an inherently inefficient architecture when
solving the huge matrices involved in the planning of a complex national
forest. Even a comparatively simple forest planning problem produces
huge matrices which require a mainframe computer and a large amount of
CPU time and cost to solve. These requirements frequently restrict the
planners' ability to represent their forest with a sufficient degree of
resolution in the FORPLAN model.
For example, the Lolo National Forest planners originally stratified
the land into three slope classes. They placed breaks at 35 % slope (above
which logging becomes considerably more expensive) and at 60 % slope
(above which certain environmental problems with logging arise). The
planners found that this scheme resulted in more land strata than
FORPLAN could accommodate, so they subsequently combined all slope
classes below 60 %, reducing the number of analysis areas to 220, a number
which met the size limitations of the model. Because they averaged logging
costs for land above and below 35 % slope, important resolution was lost.
20. N FMA requires periodic forest planning at least every 15 years. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f) (1982).
21. McQuillan, The Declining Even Flow Effect-Non Sequitur Of National Forest Planning,
32(4) FOREST SCIENCE 960 (Dec. 1986).
22. F. HILLIER AND G. LIEBERMAN, INTRODUCTION To OPERATIONS RESEARCH 24-26 (1980).
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Thus, the model might incorrectly eliminate gently-sloping land from
logging because costs were shown to be too high, or incorrectly allocate
steeper lands to logging because costs were not shown to be high enough.23
Another problem is that FORPLAN cannot adequately handle
spatial relationships. Most people have little difficulty imagining forest
lands as river drainages or watersheds with a complex interrelationship
between adjacent stands of trees. Game animals move between ridge tops
and creek bottoms; soil erosion, like water, flows from upslope to down-
slope; certain areas can be seen from the highway and others are obscured
by topography; if a certain area is logged, then adjacent timber needs to be
left standing to provide for reseeding, and so on. However, the spatial
nature of these relationships shields them from the vision of FORPLAN.
In a roadless drainage, timber stands cannot be scheduled for logging
unless roads can be built for log hauling. However, if the forest plan
allocates a critical entry point to the drainage to remain in roadless
condition, then road building cannot proceed anywhere. This logic escapes
FORPLAN. Furthermore, expensive roads usually serve more than one
timber harvesting operation, with subsequent harvests often spread over
several decades. But, if the first scheduled harvest lies at the head of the
drainage and requires that the entire road be built immediately, then
FORPLAN cannot realistically represent road construction costs in
relation to the amount of timber harvested (computed as dollars/acre
harvested). All of these factors require a spatially-specific solution. Thus, a
model which is incapable of spatial specificity has serious shortcomings.
The nature of linear programming is such that achieving spatial
resolution is very difficult. FORPLAN was modified to allow some degree
of spatial resolution (called aggregate area emphasis), but it results in a
larger matrix, which exacerbates the computer-space limitation problems
already discussed. Consequently, this feature is seldom used. Other LP-
related approaches to this problem usually involve the use of integer
programming 4 (IP), but the architecture of IP is inherently even less
efficient than LP. The greatest hope for solving this modelling problem lies
with the development of graph theory-based models, 5 a task not yet
23. See LOLO FEIS, supra note 16, at 111-2, B-1 . The problem was first raised in a Response to
the Draft Forest Plan by the Inland Forest Resource Council, Missoula, Montana on September 26.
1980. Id. at Appendix 22.
24. M. Kirby, Mixed-Integer Models For Integrated Planning, in 1985 Symposium On
Systems Analysis In Forest Resources 315-323 (1987) (available from Georgia Center For
Continuing Education, Athens, GA).
25. See Jackson, Economic Suitability of Lands For Timber Production: A Proposed Rule of
Reason in this volume; A. McQuillan, Economic Valuation Of Timber Potential For Undeveloped
Forest Land Using A Modified Dynamic Programming Algorithm 127-144 (1985) (Stoors Interna-
tional AMSE Conference, Stoors. CT).
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approached by the Forest Service.
Pressed by time and the need to start the planning required by the
1976 Act, the agency directed the nationwide implementation of FOR-
PLAN in the late 1970s without much experimental testing. Besides the
promised analytical advantages of an optimization model, the agency also
recognized the organizational advantages of the FORPLAN model in
bringing consistency to a national planning effort that had traditionally
involved the supervisors of 191 million acres of public forest land in 156
national forests making decentralized decisions.
This rush to adopt such a sophisticated planning model brought with it
other problems. Successful implementation would have required the
presence of a competent linear programming expert on each and every
national forest. Although some forests had such experts, many planning
teams were simply devoid of a linear programmer with sufficient expertise
to not only use the model, but also to understand model behavior and teach
others to understand it, so that intelligent interactive planning could ensue.
The Forest Service rightly composed the interdisciplinary planning teams
of wildlife biologists, hydrologists, soil scientists, timber planners, recrea-
tion managers and other people, but these specialists generally had little or
no knowledge of linear programming or the restrictive assumptions
attending its use. These problems of personnel and education were not and
could not have been overcome simply by sending the planning team
members to a few days of short courses on FORPLAN modelling. As a
result,'the individuals responsible for plan preparation, although generally
competent and well-trained professionals, were forced to use a planning
technology that was generally beyond their comprehension.
This situation was described by the designer of FORPLAN himself,
Dr. K. Norman Johnson, who said:
[W]e have developed a forest planning process that may go
beyond the average planning teams' ability to implement ...
Although we tried to write FORPLAN so it would be under-
standable to potential users, we may have misjudged our clients.
We probably wrote it for the most analytically sophisticated of
the planning teams, rather than the average. This orientation,
combined with the mobility of Forest Service employees, has
meant that the average planning team may feel befuddled by
FORPLAN . . . . Travelling to the National Forests around
Oregon and around the country, it is discouraging to see how
little time is spent understanding why particular FORPLAN
results are being found on each forest.26
26. K. Johnson, Reflections on the Development of FORPLAN, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S.
FORESTSERVICE, FORPLAN: AN EVALUATION OF A FOREST PLANNING TOOL, GENERALTECHNICAL
19891
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The agency's decision to implement FORPLAN resulted in a consid-
erably more mechanistic approach to forest planning than that required by
NFMA. In adopting this hyper-mechanistic approach to forest planning,
the agency forced itself to do the impossible and, in the process, failed to
bring about the "rule of reason" that the Committee of Scientists deemed
to be the Congressional intent of N FMA." By choosing a linear program-
ming model (FORPLAN) which uses a constrained optimization tech-
nique to find the maximum NPV, the agency's forest economists indeed
"promised more than they could deliver."
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND AGENCY REGULATIONS
Although the problems associated with the economic analysis func-
tions of FORPLAN are considerable, they do not represent the only or the
most significant problems with the use of economic analysis in national
forest planning. Fundamental problems with economic analysis arise in the
way in which the Forest Service implemented NFMA with federal
regulations, and, particularly, with the way in which lands unsuitable for
timber management are determined."a
These regulations are designed to implement section 6(k) of NFMA
which states:
In developing land management plans pursuant to this Act, the
Secretary shall identify lands. . . not suited for timber produc-
tion, considering physical, economic, and other pertinent factors
... ,and shall assure that. . no timber harvesting shall occur
on such lands for a period of 10 years . . 29
In part, these regulations also implement section 6(g)(3)(e) of the Act
which states:
[This provision will] insure that timber will be harvested from
National Forest System lands only where;
(i) soil, slope, or other watershed conditions will not be irreversi-
bly damaged;
(ii) there is assurance that such lands can be adequately
restocked within five years after harvest;. 3
REPORT RM-140 45-51 (April 1987). For a further discussion of these issues, see infra Section V.
27. For an explanation of what the Committee of Scientists called a "rule of reason," see
Teeguarden, Benefit-Cost Analysis in National Forest System Planning: Policy. Uses. and Limita-
tions, 17 ENVTL. L. 393, 395 (1987).
28. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a), (b) and (c) (1988).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(k) (1982).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i), (ii) ( 1982). The five-year restocking provision originated in
an official Forest Service report in 1971. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, NATIONAL
FOR EST MANAGEMENT IN A QUALITY ENVIRONMENT: TIMBER PRODUCTIVITY 1-11 (1971). According to
Wilkinson and Anderson, the report "suggested that land be withdrawn from timber production where
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Congress enacted this language to address the widely-shared views of the
Church Public Lands Subcommittee of the Senate which, in 1972,
concluded that certain Forest Service lands had been logged "which
should not have been subjected to any activity related to timber harvest-
ing. . . . These were areas of special scenic values, fragile soils, or other
limiting physiographic conditions, areas where adequate regeneration
could not be assured, and areas where the costs of special measures to
avoid environmental damage or assure regeneration were so high that the
activity was imprudent and relatively uneconomic."'
Much has been written about section 6 of NFMA, which incorporates
this Congressional intent, since the language does not clearly stipulate
what kind of economic analysis is required, or the extent to which the
analysis should be used in the determination of lands unsuitable for timber
harvesting. Dr. Dennis Teeguarden, a member of the Committee of
Scientists (COS) which drafted the regulations, concluded, "[I]t is fairly
clear that the conferees [COS] did not want the Secretary to harvest
timber on lands where by some rule of reason public benefits were less than
production costs."32 As Professor Charles Wilkinson commented, "These
carefully chosen words should be taken to heart. '33
The Forest Service adopted a three-step screening process to ap-
proach the timber suitability question. In subsection (a), the agency
screens all forest lands for overriding administrative or legal restrictions
that would preclude timber harvesting (such as prior designation under the
Wilderness Act), and for physical and biological limitations related to the
propensity for soil or watershed damage, or the inability to assure adequate
forest regeneration within five years following logging.34 The Forest
Service refers to this as stage 1 of the suitability test. With regard to soil or
watershed damage, the regulation states that lands shall be identified as
not suited for timber production where "technology is not available to
ensure timber production from the land without irreversible resource
damage to soils productivity, or watershed conditions. ' 5 Thus, Congress
intended NFMA to stop timber cutting where it was likely to result in
severe ecological damage. By phrasing the regulation narrowly in terms of
reforestation could not be assured within five years after logging." Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note
4, at 140-141.
3 1. "Clearcutting" Practices on National Timberlands: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1972)
(emphasis added).
32. Teeguarden, supra note 27, at 403-4 (emphasis altered).
33. Wilkinson and Anderson, Below-Cost Sales - Are They Legal?, 85 J. FORESTRY 21, 25
(Aug. 1987).
34. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a) (1988).
35. Id. at § 219.14(a)(2).
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technology, the Forest Service effectively circumvented this part of the
screening process. For example, in 1975, the Timber Management Plan for
the Rio Grande National Forest withdrew from harvesting 6,000 acres of
land because of unstable soils. In the final NFMA Plan, the agency
withdrew no lands for this reason.36 Despite a history of landslides during
the intervening ten years, the agency defended its omission on the basis of
the wording in the regulations:
[Plaintiff's] suggestion that the deletion of 6,000 acres in a 1975
Timber Management Plan because of "unstable soils" requires
that the Plan make similar deletions ignores the fact that the test
of the regulations, adopted in 1979, is different, focusing as it
does on the availability of technology. . .. The result was that
the stratification "unstable soils" was not used in the Planning
process . 3
Similarly, the agency relied on the availability of technology rather
than on operational feasibility with regard to regeneration. The third part
of subsection (a) states that lands shall be identified as not suited for timber
production where "there is not reasonable assurance that such lands can be
adequately restocked as provided in § 219.27(c)(3). '"38 And the referenced
subsection states:
[timber] cuttings shall be made in such a way as to assure that the
technology and knowledge exists to adequately restock the lands
within 5 years after final harvest.39
In responding to appeals of forest plans, the Forest Service has argued
that statistical studies of past regeneration performance are not particu-
larly relevant since the emphasis of the regulation is on the existence of
technology and knowledge rather than on proven accomplishments." In
response to an appeal of the Beaverhead Forest Plan on this issue, the
Regional Forester stated, "Research, in this case is considered to be
findings published in referred journals and papers."41 Most forests in
Region 1 excluded very few lands on the basis of regeneration difficulty,
36. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, Rio GRANDE NATIONAL FOREST LAND AND
RLESOLRCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1985).
37. Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs and Intervenors' Briefs at 6 n. 5.
Citizens for Environmental Quality v. United States, No. 87-F-1714. (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 1988)
(emphasis added).
38. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(3) (1988).
39. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c)(3).
40. Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs and Intervenor's Briefs, supra note 37,
at 5-6,
41 Regional Forester's Responsive Statement to the National Wildlife Federation Appeal of
the Beoverhead National Forest Land Management Plan (Sept. 28, 1987).
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despite the fact that regeneration tardiness had been a major concern here
and elsewhere prior to passage of NFMA. Wilkinson and Anderson
reported, "A 1974 Forest Service report, for instance, revealed that only
one-third of the cutover land in the Rocky Mountain national forests was
successfully regenerating."42
The Forest Service Manual reflects this move to de-emphasize the
rigor of the regeneration screening process:
All the [reforestation] problems encountered are-solvable.
In general, if sites meet the criteria for timber, soil, and water
productivity for soil and water protection, and are harvestable
with current logging equipment, then there is seldom any reason
to preclude them from management due to reforestation
problems.43
If the Israelis can grow grapes in the desert, the logic seems to hold, then
foresters can regenerate trees in the Rocky Mountains. However, the
availability of technology is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
successful, prompt reforestation. It must also be applied in fact, and it must
be applied successfully, sometimes with repeated operations such as
replanting trees after the first or second attempts have failed. And one must
ask, at what cost?
The Church Subcommittee, quoted above, did not want the agency to
harvest timber where the costs of regeneration were imprudent, and an
earlier draft of NFMA had proposed logging only on lands "which, within
five years after timber harvest, will regenerate the growth of trees naturally
or with a modest reforestation investment."44 Although Congress omitted
this specific language from the statute, the call for prudence is clear. At the
very least, prudence would require not only that technology for prompt
regeneration exists, but also that the agency successfully employ it.
Furthermore, prudence would require an economic test taking into account
the probability of success of the technology and the most likely final, total
cost of the regeneration effort. Forest Service Chief McGuire's testimony
confirms this interpretation. He stated, "[ Wie do not intend to manage the
[economically] submarginal lands for timber production, but, on the
other hand, we may want to do some timber harvesting for wildlife, water,
42. Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note 4, at 154 (reviewing U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., U.S.
FOREST SERVICE, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN TIMBER SITUATION 1970 25-26 (Research Bulletin INT- 10
(1974))).
43. FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK § 2409.26(B) R-1 (1988).
44. Conim. on Agriculture and, Forestry and Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs.
Comparison of S. 3091. as Amended. With Proposed Amendments By Sen. Metcalf § 3(d)(5)(C)(v),
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (emphasis added), cited in Wilkinson and Anderson,supra note 4, at 156 n.
807.
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or other reasons."45
The statute requires the Forest Service to declare unsuitable for
timber harvesting all lands where regeneration cannot be assured within
five years following logging. The regulations implementing this section do
not appear to provide the rigorous screening process necessary to provide
this assurance.46 As a result, this stage of the suitability test withdraws very
few of the tentatively suitable timberlands.
Having supposedly screened for administrative and ecological imped-
iments to timber suitability in section 219.14 (a), subsection (b) directs the
analysis of site-specific economic efficiency. This regulation clearly
stipulates:
[Lands tentatively suitable for timber production] shall be
further reviewed and assessed prior to formulation of alternatives
.. This analysis shall identify the management intensity for
timber production for each category of land which results in the
largest excess of discounted benefits less discounted costs ....
Direct benefits are expressed as expected gross receipts to the
government.17
With this analysis, the Forest Service intended to ensure some attempt at
identifying efficient timber management prescriptions before they are
entered into the FORPLAN model. Absent such attempts, there is a risk
that FORPLAN might find timberlands to be unsuitable which are, in
fact, quite efficient for timber production on a site-specific basis. The
FORPLAN model can only accommodate a limited number of prescrip-
tions, and without pre-screening and careful selection, there is a good
chance that, in all of its options, the direct costs of timber production will
exceed the direct benefits.
The need for this analysis is reduced if FORPLAN is allowed to assign
any and all tentatively suitable lands to the suitable timber base regardless
of site-specific economic efficiency. This explains why the agency stated
45. Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry and Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs. Transcript of Proceedings, S. 3091 As Amended! 14 (May 4 1976) (emphasis added) c ited in
Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note 4, at 165 n. 845.
46. 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.14(a) and 219.27(c)(3) (1988). Another serious deficiency in the
regulations lies in the definition of when the five-year clock is set to begin running. For example, 36
C.F.R. § 219.27(c)(3) states, "Five years after final harvest means ... 5 years after the seed tree
removal cut in seed tree cutting ... "As any forestry student should know, regeneration in a seed tree
cut is expected to occur following the initial logging when the seed trees were left to provide a source of
seed. If regeneration did not occur at this time, foresters would consider the attempt a failure. As the
regulation is written, a failure would not occur unless regeneration had not been achieved by 5 years
after the final removal of the seed trees. And, of course, this event could be postponed indefinitely by
simply never removing the few seed trees left on the site. This interpretation of N FMA is ludicrous and
has the effect of creating a loophole in the law.
47. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(b) (emphasis added).
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that this "second stage requires merely the evaluation of the potential
economic efficiency of the tentatively suitable land."148
Subsection (b) requires only that the Forest Service carry out the
analysis. It provides no screening process for removal of land from the
suitable timber base on grounds of its intrinsic economic efficiency, or lack
thereof, for timber production.49 Because this subsection does not provide
an economic screening process, it appears to circumvent the intent of
NFMA with regard to the delineation of submarginal lands.
The history of NFMA clearly shows that Congress did not intend to
guide timber management decision making solely with strict economic
criteria.5" However, it is equally clear that Congress intended economic
efficiency to form an important part of the "rule of reason" recognized by
the Committee of Scientists (COS). As COS member Teeguarden wrote:
[The] COS took issue with the view that economic efficiency was
the sole criterion for decision making, stating that "congressional
direction of this sort is evident only in one area, that is, the
determination of lands suitable for timber production .... 51
According to Wilkinson and Anderson, "[T] he Committee's [COS] intent
was to compel planners to apply the analysis required by 36 C.F.R. §
219.14(b) in order to identify economically unsuitable lands."52
Gorte and Baldwin of the Congressional Research Service affirmed
this view:
Congress rejected the Senate language that based the determina-
tion [of suitable timber lands] solely on an economic analysis of
the direct costs and returns from projected timber production;
rather the Secretary was instructed to consider physical factors
of the lands in question, economics, and "other pertinent factors
to the extent feasible." The legislative history strongly suggests
that the language was expanded to provide greater flexibility to
the Secretary in making the determinations, in view of the fact
that forest lands and conditions are so varied nationwide. . ...1
48. Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's and Intervenors' Briefs, supra note 37,
at 16 (emphasis added).
49. Defendant's Memorandum states that tentatively suitable lands do not get eliminated at this
stage (2) since "the regulations do not require the deletion of analysis areas disclosed by the stage I I
analysis to have negative net worth for timber production." Id. On the Rio Grande National Forest, 37
of the 40 analysis areas had a negative net worth for timber production. See Rio GRANDE FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 36.
50. See generally Wilkinson and Anderson supra note 4; also Teeguarden, supra note 27.
5I. Teeguarden, supra note 27, at 405 (citing Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44
Fed. Reg 26,599, 26,635 (1979)).
52. Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note 4, at 194 (emphasis added).
53. R. Gorte and P. Baldwin, The Timberlands Suitability Provision of the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 39 (April 11, 1986) (available from Congressional Research Service, The
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However, it appears that physical factors (related to the intrinsic
characteristics of the lands themselves) and the profitability of
timber investments were intended to be the basic considerations
in identifying lands suited for timber production ..... [I]t also
appears that Congress intended the resource evaluations, includ-
ing the timberland suitability determination, to be conducted
before formulating and evaluating alternatives.54
In fact, the regulations do not require the determinaton of economic
suitability at this second stage (governed by 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(b)),
instead they leave it until the third stage, after formulation of the plan
alternatives and during their evaluation. Subsections (a) and (b), when
taken together, screen out very little land as unsuitable for timber
management on the basis of its intrinsic characteristics and postpone
almost the entire suitability question until the third and last stage of the
suitability determination.
The regulation that guides the third stage states, in part, "Lands shall
be tentatively identified as not appropriate for timber production . . . if
(3) The lands are not cost-efficient, over the planning horizon, in
meeting forest objectives, which include timber production. ' 55 The Forest
Service has explained, "As can be seen, the regulations specifically include
timber production goals as a relevant factor in determining which lands are
suitable for timber production."5
In allowing predetermined output goals to drive the timberland
suitability process, forest planners are violating the Congressional intent of
N FMA with regard to the suitability question. If the agency sets timber or
other closely related production goals sufficiently high at the outset, then
they will force any and all tentatively suitable timberlands into the timber
base, no matter how patently unsuitable for timber production (or more
valuable for other, non-timber uses) they may be on a case by case basis. As
Wilkinson and Anderson stated:
A legislative history of the NFMA indicates that Congress
intended harvest levels to be determined by local plans-from
the bottom up rather than from the top down.5 1
Under direction of Forest Service regulations, however, harvest levels are
driven by national or regional output goals from the top rather than by site-
specific conditions from the bottom.
Library of Congress) (citing Final Report of the Committee of Scientists. 44 Fed. Reg. 26,599
(1979)).
54. Id. at 41 (emphasis added and emphasis in the original).
55. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
56. Regional Forester's Responsive Statement, supra note 41, at 17.
57. Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note 4. at 90.
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By effectively eliminating the impact of the site-specific suitability
screens at stages I and II and by allowing the suitable timberlands to be
defined in relation to the need to meet targeted outputs during stage III, the
agency has grossly distorted the entire thrust of the N FMA with regard to
suitability. A remark made by Gorte and Baldwin of the Congressional
Research Service might explain one underlying reason for this distortion,
"Changing the current regulations to require a revenue-cost comparison
before forming alternatives could drastically alter the acreage of timber-
land identified as suited for timber production in the national forest
plans"5 8
Determining, in major part, the economic suitability of timberland
relative to a prior determined timber production goal as permitted by
section 219.14 is clearly incongruous with the intent of section 6(k) of
NFMA. The Congressional Research Service authors support this
conclusion:
Because the current regulations do not appear to require the kind
of economic analysis Congress envisioned, and because the
regulations appear to result in a comparative evaluation of the
ability of lands to meet timber output targets, rather than of their
basic ability to sustain profitable commercial timber invest-
ments, a court might well conclude that the current regulations
do not carry out the intent of Congress as to the separate
timberland evaluation of section 6(k).59
IV. RESTORATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
Can one conclude, therefore, that the problems with economic
analysis in FORPLAN and the problems with the economic suitability
determination as codified in the Federal Regulations together jeopardize
the success of Forest Service planning under NFMA? Perhaps. But, the
planning process as designed and implemented contains a more fundamen-
tal problem.
Clearly, Congress enacted the National Forest Management Act
essentially as a response to a failure of trust on the part of the public with
respect to the practices of the Forest Service.60 This loss of faith in
58. Gorte and Baldwin, supra note 53, at 44 (emphasis added).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Churchman pointed out the vast difference that often lies between the stated and the true
objectives of a complex system. He has also shown how part of the job of the management scientist or
planner is to sort out the system's true objectives and respond to them in designing its methodology of
planning. Churchmansupra note 15. The true objective of planning under N FMA was undoubtably to
restore the public trust in Forest Service land management. However, Felsen pointed out how there is
no objective way to design an objective planning system. J. FELSEN, DECISION MAKING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH (1976). Planning systems should be
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professional expertise, and consequent collapse of trust, grew out of the
narrow timber management focus of the agency prior to the 1970s.6 The
public landowners of the national forests perceived an insensitivity by
agency foresters to the needs and desires of the people. These needs and
desires related principally to the protection of aesthetic values in the forest.
They also related substantially to environmental concerns and to the need
for some "rule of reason" with regard to the expenditure of public funds.
The need for sensitivity with regard to aesthetics was clearly ex-
pressed by Senate bill co-sponsor Humphrey, who declared:
The days have ended when the forest may be viewed only as trees
and trees viewed only as timber. The soil and the water, the
grasses and the shrubs, the fish and the wildlife, and the beauty
that is the forest must become integral parts of resource man-
ager's thinking and actions. 2
Attempts to force sensitivity to aesthetic, environmental and economic
concerns on the Forest Service led to significant disruptions in the
management of national forests in the early 1970s, the most famous of
which were the Bitterroot controversy63 and the Monongahela decision of
1973, upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1975.64
In response to these disruptions, Congress enacted the National
Forest Management Act to bring about the sensitivity and the rule of
reason demanded by the public. Thus, much of the language of the Act
addresses the substantive issues of timber harvesting, planning, economic
designed thoughtfully and insightfully to respond to the essential needs of the clientele, and a crucial
first step in this process must be the identification of the true nature of the client's problem. Therefore,
with N FMA, the first job for the Forest Service was to design a planning scheme that could effectively
restore the public trust.
61. See generally D. CLARY, supra note 18, at 252; also Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note 4,
at 371.
62. 122 CONG. REC. 5618-19 (1976), quoted in Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note 4, at 70.
Similar views were expressed by Acting Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Forests Melcher,
who stated that the House bill "'directs that the Forest Service must protect watersheds . . . must
protect streams, must protect wildlife habitat, and must preserve aesthetic values in planning all of the
timber sales in any of the units of the national forest." 122 CONG. REC. 30,525 (1776), quoted in
Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note 4, at 75. The consideration of aesthetic values has been only
scantily addressed in the regulations and in the plans, and yet it remains a root cause of much current
public concern.
63. Senator Lee Metcalf requested a report from the Select Committee of the University of
Montana in 1970 on Forest Service practices in the Bitterroot National Forest. The Select Committee
presented its findings to Congress in a report entitled A University View of the Forest Service, also
known as the Bolle Report. S. Doc. 115, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Compare Bolle, The Bitterroot
Revisited: A University Re- View of the Forest Service in this volume.
64. West Virginia Div. of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, (4th
Cir. 1975), affg 367 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. W.Va. 1973). See, e.g., Wilkinson and Anderson, supra note
4, at 41; Wilkinson and Anderson, Below-Cost Sales - Are They Legal?, 85 J. FORESTRY 21 (March
1987).
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analysis and environmental protection. It is understandable that agency
planners perceived the Act to be a call for adoption of a planning system
designed to achieve efficient maximization of net public benefits, 5 since
this is consistent with a utilitarian approach to multiple-use management.
However, one must recognize that, in the first instance, Congress designed
NFMA to bring about a restoration of public faith and trust in Forest
Service management.
V. CONCLUSION
As the mechanism for a restoration of trust, Congress had previously
provided for public involvement through the National Environmental
Policy Act, 6 and as the vehicle, Congress established the forest planning
process. By the sensitive application of rules of reason exposed to public
scrutiny, Congress hoped that the agency would demonstrate the reasona-
bleness of its management decisions to a skeptical public and, conse-
quently, restore public trust in the management professionals. This was the
true intent of NFMA. To ensure the success of forest planning, the public
would have to have access to the planning process, would have to be able to
understand the planning process and would have to perceive that there
were no attempts to cloud the planning process in a veil of deception or
secrecy. In order to meet these conditions, it was attendant upon those who
designed the planning process to insure that it was transparent, readily
comprehensible, and open to public review.
It appears that the designers of the forest planning process never
recognized this need. Instead, they perceived an overriding need to
determine the optimal, socially efficient forest plan. To accomplish this,
they adopted a sophisticated "black box" model (FORPLAN) which is not
only inaccessible to many of the agency's own professionals, but also
beyond the general reach and scrutiny of an intelligent lay public. The
inventor of the FORPLAN model, Johnson, made this same point:
The disadvantage [of the planning model] is that no one besides
the "analyst" may know how they are representing their forest
planning problems in FORPLAN. Thus, the Forest Supervisor
and the Forest Planner who often have to meet with the public to
discuss FORPLAN results, may have no clear idea about the
forest plan model that is producing the results they are trying to
defend. . . . FORPLAN remains a mystery because it repre-
sents forest planning problems in ways that run counter to how
65. See generally Krutilla and Haigh, An Integrated Approach to National Forest Manage-
ment, 8 ENVTL. L. 373 (1978).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1982).
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people think about these problems.67
Anyone who has tried to unravel the mysteries of a particular forest plan is
familiar with the problem.
Teeguarden also recognized these issues related to the public review of
forest plans:
Also troublesome is that the size and complexity of the model
required to represent the planning problem may make it impossi-
ble for external reviewers to identify and track the effect of rules
for constraint construction on results.6 8
In the end, we have in place a planning system which, by its very
complexity and opacity, is likely to fail in the mission for which it was
intended, the restoration of public trust in the management of national
forest lands by United States Forest Service professionals. The outcome,
thus far, has been the myriad appeals filed on forest plans throughout the
nation. The inevitable litigation is just beginning.
This litigation is not necessarily unwelcome. As with NEPA, case
history will establish the intent of Congress and give meaning to crucial
words and phrases in the Act. However, the complexity of the planning
process adopted in response to NFMA seems to inhibit the ability of the
judicial system to review alleged violations of the Act. Attorneys who are
unfamiliar with the National Forest Management Act have a hard time
understanding its complex provisions and an even harder time understand-
ing the adopted planning process. Consequently, they tend to fall back on
NEPA-related issues with which courts are more familiar and ignore
substantive provisions of NFMA. In many cases, this is necessary because
the courts cannot comprehend the intricacies of the forest planning
process.
The inaccessibility of NFMA raises serious doubts about its prospects
for success. If the Act cannot be effectively litigated, then neither the
public nor the courts have access to the planning process designed to
comply with the Act. It follows that the Act will not likely restore any
reasonableness and trust in the management of national forest lands. And
thus, we are no further ahead than we were in the mid-1970s prior to the
passage of NFMA.
67. Johnson, supra note 26, at 48.
68. Teeguarden, supra note 27, at 422-23.
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